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CONGRESSIONAL POWER OVER ELECTIONS
Of recent national interest has been the problem of equal suffrage
of the Negro in the South.' Many attempts have been made to exclude
this race from the voting place by various methods running the gamut from
state grandfather statutes to actual and open violence. One method now
in vogue is literacy tests, inequitably administered. To counter state and
local discrimination, many people have turned to the federal Congress. A
recent result has been two bills, Senate Bill S4802 introduced on January
17, 1961, and Senate Bill S27503 introduced on January 25, 1962. Although
neither bill had been acted upon at the time this article was written, it is
clear that the issues these bills raise are among the most heated of the
day. The purpose of this paper is: (1) to define the powers of Congress
in this area, and (2) to investigate these two bills within the context
of these powers.
Although the terms have not been judicially defined or in general
usage, in this paper the term "national elections" will be used to indicate
elections in which the office and the manner of selection derives from
the Constitution of the United States, while the term "local or state
elections" will refer to those elections in which these powers have derived
from the state or subdivision thereof.
Thus, the elections of senators and representatives are clearly national,
as the definition of the offices are found in Amendment XVI 4 for senators
and Article 1, Section 25 for representatives, and the Congressional power
to regulate the election of these officers comes from Article I, Section 4. 6
A territorial election would also be a national election as Congress
has power under Article IV, Section 3 T to make all needful rules respecting
territories.
The election of the electors for the President and the Vice-President
of the United States does not fit into the dichotomy of national and state
election terminology. It has been held that the electors are officers of
the state and their election is not a federal election.8 However, they do
exercise a federal function in balloting for the President and the Vicepresident. They act by the authority of the state but the state in turn
receives its authority from the Federal Constitution. 9 The office of the
elector is defined by Article II, Section 1, clause 210 which gives to the
states the power to designate the manner in which he shall acquire the
office.
1. 1961 U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights Report; Voting 1..
2. S480, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
3. S2750, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).
4. U.S. Const. Amend. XVII.
5. U.S. Const. art. I, § 2.
6. U.S. Const. art. I, § 4.
7. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3.
8. Walker v. United States, 93 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1937).
9. Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214 (1951).
10. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, clause 2.
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All other elections are local elections.
It becomes necessary to separately define the Congressional powers
over the election of electors of the President and the Vice-President of the
United States as this election is in a limbo of its own. In the case of
Burroughs v. United States" the court held as proper the Congressional
control over groups which attempt to influence the election of Presidential
electors in two or more states or through a national organization; in other
words, this aspect of the presidential electoral process is to be classified as
national. If the activities are wholly contained within a state, then the
election will be treated as if it were a local election.
The -powers of Congress over a state election can only come from the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, 12 whereas, in national elections,
Congress has much broader powers.
Article I, Section 4 reads:
The times, places and manner of holding elections for senators
and representatives shall be prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by law make
or alter such regulations ....13
This section has been interpreted to mean that in these elections, Con4
gress is supreme in its power to control the election.'
If Congress does not interfere, of course they may be made wholly
by the state; but if it chooses to interfere, there is nothing in the
words of [Article I, Section 4] to prevent its doing so, either
wholly or partially. 1"
Therefore, it is quite clear that Congress, if it wished, could limit the use
of the literacy test in a national election or even eliminate it. It possesses
the power if it wishes to exercise it.
When practices under local elections are in question the Congress
is limited in its powers to the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and
the enabling clauses thereunder.' 6 Contrary to popular belief, the Fifteenth
Amendment does not grant the Negro "the right to vote."'17 Indeed, the
right to vote is not an attribute of federal citizenship.' 8 The Amendment
simply states that if United States citizens are not to be allowed to vote,
the reason cannot be race, color, or previous condition of servitude. Thus,
in state elections, including those in which presidential electors are chosen,
the state is prefectly free, within limitations presently to be discussed,
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1933).
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875); Davis v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872
(S.D. Ala. 1949); aff'd, 336 U.S. 933 (1949).
Supra note 6.
United States v. Mosely, 238 U.S. 383 (1915); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651
(1884); United States v. Gale, 109 U.S. 65 (1883); Ex parte Clarke, 100 U.S. 399
(1880); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 399 (1880).
Ex parte Siebold, supra note 14 at 383.
Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915) ; James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127 (1903)
United States v. Cruikshank, supra note 12; Lackey v. United States, 107 Fed. 114
(6th Cir. 1901) ; Davis v. Schnell, supra note 12.
United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876).
United States v. Cruikshank, supra note 12.
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to impose its own standards for voting. For example, insistence by the
state upon the absence of criminal conduct, 19 a specified period of residency
within the state, 20 and the payment of a poll tax 2 1 have all been held
proper. Before the enactment of the Nineteenth Amendment it was held
that a state could exclude the right of suffrage from women or grant it to
them as it wished, and Congress would be impotent to stop the discrimina22
tion.
On what questions in the area of state elections may Congress legislate? The major limitation on the Congressional power under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments is that a state, and a state alone, is
prohibited from discriminating. Therefore, private individuals cannot
be made to answer in federal court for acts which prevent a Negro from
23
voting in a local election.
24
It might be argued that under the doctrine of Shelley v. Kraemer
(in which restrictive covenants were declared to be valid, but unenforceable by a state court, because to do so would constitute state action)
the failure of a local prosecutor to prosecute individuals for violating
local election laws makes such refusal to act "state action" within the
Fourteenth Amendment. However, in Shelley v. Kraemer the action of the
state court was a positive action, while here inaction would be involved.
At best, the argument of Shelley v. Kraemer would here have only questionable validity.

It might be further argued that the doctrine of Brewer v. Hoxie
School Dist. No. 4625 would apply to voting. In this case a federal court
assumed jurisdiction, recognizing a federal question, when groups of
private citizens moved to prevent the voluntary integration of a public
school. The court based its jurisdiction upon the fact that the school
board was under a duty, by oath of office, to uphold the Constitution of
the United States and that the conspiracy by the defendants to interfere
with their duty under the Fourteenth Amendment as defined in Brown v.
Board of Education2 6 violated the school board's federal rights. The full
ramifications of this decision have yet to be discovered. The size and
power of the conspiracy may be a controlling consideration. In the case of
Collins v. Hardyman,2 T the federal courts refused jurisdiction on the
grounds that the breaking up by members of the American Legion of a
meeting held by United States citizens in order to petition Congress on
foreign policy was not a sufficient conspiracy. It would only be conjecture to attempt to predict whether a federal court would entertain a
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621 (1904).
Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937).
Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162 (1875).
James v. Bowman. supra note 16; Lackey v. United States, supra note 16.
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
Brewer v. Hoxie School Dist. No. 46, 238 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1956).
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651 (1951).
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suit by an election official, intimated by a White Citizens Council, to seek
his federal remedies.
Therefore, so far as local elections are concerned, Congress is restricted
to power over acts which are state acts, or are done under color of state
law, and which are discriminatory. Such past state acts which have been
held to be discriminatory are best exemplied by the Oklahoma "grandfather clause." The state constitution provided that any person was
deemed registered to vote if his ancestor had been registered to vote in
1862. Historically, the Negro was still a slave at the time, hence few
Negroes could qualify under this provision. Thus, although never specifically excluding or even mentioning the Negro or any race, the state
constitution set up such restrictions as discriminated specifically against
the Negro. The court recognized that this was discriminatory as to the
Negro within the prohibition of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.

28

An impartially applied literacy test, however, has been held not to be
discriminatory2 9 as "literacy and illiteracy are neutral on race, creed, color,
and sex." 30 A test of literacy is a reasonable test because it goes to the
very heart of intelligent voting. It is irrelevant that it happens to fall
more harshly upon one racial group than upon others.3 1
Literacy, however, is a relative term. The dictionary 32 defines it in
two ways
(I) a learned person and (2) one who can read and write.
Between these two definitions there runs a wide spectrum of learning.
The states have great latitude in determining for themselves where along
this spectrum the minimum educational requirement shall be for voting. 33
The only federal questions would be that the standards for the tests be
definite, that they be applied consistently and without racial discrimination in fact, and that they be reasonable.
One of the usual types of litearcy tests now in use is the requirement
that a prospective voter must be able to read and write any section of the
state constitution. 34 This has been held in Lassiter v. Northhampton
County Board of Electors35 to be proper. In Davis v. Schnell36 the court
held a test which required that an individual be able to understand and
explain the state constitution too indefinite to be interpreted fairly and
uniformly.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Guinn v. United States, supra note 16.
Lassiter v. Northhampton County Board of Electors, 360 U.S. 45 (1959); Guinn
v. United States, supra note 16; Comacho v. Rogers, 199 F. Supp. 155 (S.D. N.Y.
1961); Darby v. Daniel, 168 F. Supp. 170 (S.D. Miss. 1958).
Lassiter v. Northhampton, supra note 29.
Camacho v. Rogers, supra note 29.
Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, G. & C. Merrian Co., Springfield, Mass. (1953).
Lassiter v. Northhampton, supra note 29.
For example, see N.C. Const. art. VI, § 4.
Lassiter v. Northhampton, supra note 29.
Davis v. Schnell, supra note 12.
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One of the early attempts to solve the problems of civil rights was
Section 5507 of the Criminal Code. 37 It reads:
Every person who prevents, hinders, controls, or intimidates
another from exercising, or in exercising the right of suffrage,
to whom the right is guaranteed by the Fifteenth Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States, by means of bribery
or threats of depriving such person of employment or occupation, or of ejecting such person from a rented house, lands, or
other property, by threat of refusing to renew leases or contracts
for labor, or by threats of violence to himself or family, shall be
punished as provided in the preceding section.
In the case of Lackey v. United States, 38 several white men were indicted
under Section 5507 for having bribed certain Negros in order to keep
them from voting in a state election. The section was held to be unconstitutional on two grounds: (1) the statute did not differentiate between
state and national elections, and (2) it did not state that the obstruction
to the voting of these Negroes must be because of race. Congress cannot
constitutionally prohibit every attempt to keep an individual from
voting in a state election.
A federal statute which has been upheld is 18 U.S.C. § 25239, which
reads:
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
inhabitant of any state, territory, or district to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges or immunities secured or protected by
the Constitution and laws of the United States, or to different
punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of such inhabitant
being an alien, or by reason of his color, or race, then are prescribed for the punishment of citizens ...
In United States v. Classic,40 election officials of the State of Louisiana
were indicted under Section 242 and convicted for falsifying the vote count
in a primary United States Congressional election. This was held to have
deprived citizens of the right to have their vote counted, which is the
same as being deprived of the -vote, and the right of candidates to be
properly considered by the voters.
In Screws v. United States,41 the defendant, a state police officer,
arrested a Negro and then beat him to death. Screws was also indicted
and convicted under Section 242. The court held that he was acting
under the color a state law although no specific law allowed him to do
the acts which he did.
As in the Screws case, if a registrar of voters, acting under a constitutional state statute should vary from the statute in order to deprive
38.
39.

U.S. Rev. Stat. § 5507.
Lackey v. United States, supra note 16.
18 U.S.C. § 242 (1950).

40.
41.

United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
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a Negro of his federal rights, that is his rights under the Fifteenth Amendment, he would also be open to prosecution under Section 242. However, further legislation on this subject proved to be necessary because of
procedural difficulties which state officials raised, 4 2 and this led to the
44
Civil Rights Acts of 195743 and 1960.
Legislation by Congress which prohibits and punishes acts of state
officials which knowingly deprive any individual of a right or a privilege
under the Federal Constitution because of his race will clearly be held
constitutional.
Coming now to a consideration of the two bills recently introduced in
Congress: Senate bill S48045 is an example of what would seem to be

unconstitutional Congressional action in the area of local elections.
provides in part:

It

All citizens of the United States who are otherwise qualified by
law to vote at any election by the people in any local election
shall be allowed to vote without subjection to any arbitrary or unreasonable test, standard , or practice with respect to literacy....
Arbitrary or unreasonable test, standard, or practice with respect
to literacy shall mean any requirement designed to determine
literacy, comprehension, intelligence, or other test of education,
knowledge, or understanding, in the case of any citizen who has not
been adjudged an incompetent who has completed the sixth
primary grade in a school accredited by any state or by the
District of Columbia. (Emphasis supplied.)
The right to vote, as stated above, is not an attribute of national citizenship. "The Fifteenth Amendment does not confer the right of suffrage
upon anyone. ''46 It is not a right but a privilege granted by the states.
The privileges and immunities protected are only those that arise
from the Constitution and laws 47of the United States and not those
that spring from other sources.
Therefore, the states and not the federal Congress have the freedom to
choose where along the spectrum of literacy shall be the limitation on the
voter. The above bill destroys this choice and imposes upon the states the
will of Congress. If a state would wish to set a limitation on voting
such as the achievement of five grades or seven grades of education, it
would be prohibited from doing so if this bill is constitutional, even though
the action of the state would meet all constitutional requirements. Therefore, the bill must be considered an arbitrary act of Congress and should
be deemed unconstitutional.
Senate bill S2750 48 contains substantive provisions similar to those
42.

See Civil Rights Report, supra note 1 at 73.

43.

42 U.S.C. § 1971 (b)

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

42 U.S.C. § 1971(c); § 1971(e); § 1974 (1958).
Supra note 2.
United States v. Reese, supra note 17 at 217.
Breedlove v. Suttles, supra note 21 at 283.
Supra note 3.

(1958).
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of S480, except that it applies only to federal elections. It defines federal
elections as:
any general, special, or primary election held solely or in part
for the purpose of electing or selecting any candidate for the office
of President, Vice President, presedential elector, member of the
senate or member of the house of representatives, delegate, or commissioner from the territories or possessions.
This bill is clearly constitutional as within Congress' powers under Article
I, Section 449 and Article IV, Section 350 except that the substantive provisions applying to the election of the presidential electors are too vague. 5 '
Thus, men zealous in their desire to raise the Negro to a ,position of
political equality with white persons have fallen into pitfalls in regard to
Congressional power over local elections. Barring a constitutional amend52
ment, which would have undesirable ramifications in our federal system,
the federal legislators must limit themselves to regulating those in official
state positions who are bent on unjustifiably depriving the Negro of the
vote in local elections. It is hoped that severe penalties for these violators
coupled with the type of supervision and energy shown by the federal
courts in the school integration cases will one day lead to the results for
which many people pray.
STUART

49.
50.
51.
52.

B.

SCHOENBURG

Supra note 6.
Supra note 7.
Lackey v. United States, supra note 16.
"Beyond doubt the Amendment [15th) does not take away from the state governments in a general sense the power over suffrage which has belonged to those
governments from the beginning and without the possession of which power
the whole fabric upon which the division of state and national authority under
the Constitution and the organization of both governments rest would be without
support and both the authority of the nation and the state would fall to the
ground." Guinn v. United States, supra note 16 at 362.

